Tribunal Arbitral du Sport
Court of Arbitration for Sport

CAS 2014/A/3485 World Anti-Doping Agency v. Ms Daria Goltsova and International Weightlifting Federation

ARBITRAL AWARD

delivered by the

COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT

sitting in the following composition:

President: His Honour James Robert Reid QC, West Liss, Hampshire, United Kingdom
Arbitrators: Professor Dr Martin Schimke, attorney-at-law, Dusseldorf, Germany
Mr Alexander McLin, attorney-at-law, Geneva, Switzerland.

in the arbitration **between**

WORLD ANTI-DOPING AGENCY ("WADA"), Montreal, Canada
Represented by Mr Julien Sieveking, Chief Legal Manager of WADA

Appellant

and

MS DARIA GOLTSOVA Moscow, Russia

First Respondent

INTERNATIONAL WEIGHTLIFTING FEDERATION ("IWF") Budapest, Hungary
Represented by Dr Tamas Ajan, IWF President.

Second Respondent

I. PARTIES

1. The World Anti-Doping Agency ("WADA") is the independent world anti-doping agency which has the aim of promoting, co-ordinating and monitoring, on an international level, the fight against doping in sports in all its forms. It has a principle place of business in Montreal, Canada.

2. The International Weightlifting Federation (the "IWF") is the international body governing the sport of weightlifting with its registered seat in Lausanne, Switzerland.

3. Ms Daria Goltsova (the "Athlete") is a weightlifter affiliated to the Russian Weightlifting Federation which is the national federation governing the sport of weightlifting in Russia and is affiliated to IWF.

II. THE BACKGROUND FACTS

4. On an in-competition test performed on a urine sample provided by the Athlete on 13 May 2011 on the occasion of the Youth World Championships in Lima, Peru (the "Competition"), the Athlete tested positive for a metabolite of cocaine. Cocaine is, and at all material times has been, a Non-Specified Stimulant, as classified under "S6 (a) *(Non-Specified Stimulants)*" on the 2011 WADA Prohibited List.

5. She did not contest the presence of the substance in her bodily sample. The explanation which she gave for its presence (which is accepted by WADA as being correct) is that the cocaine entered her body as a result of her consumption of a "Delisse" brand tea named "Mate de Coca" during her stay at the St. Augustine Hotel, Lima during the competition.

6. By decision of the IWF Doping Hearing Panel ("DHP") dated 20 November 2011, following a hearing on 7 November 2011, the DHP held that the Athlete had committed an anti-doping rule violation and sanctioned her with a period of ineligibility of 6 months commencing on 4 July 2011, the date on which she was provisionally suspended.

7. Despite the terms of art 8.1.6 of the IWF Anti-Doping Policy (the "ADP") in force at the time of the violation which provided: "*The IWF shall keep WADA fully apprised as to the status of pending cases and the result of all hearings*", WADA was first informed of the decision on 17 December 2013 as an attachment to an email from the IWF.

8. WADA requested the case file from the IWF by a letter dated 26 December 2013. It received documents relating to the decision under cover of an email from IWF dated 20 January 2014.

9. On 7 February 2014, WAS filed its statement of appeal (designated as its appeal brief) with the Court of Arbitration for Sport ("CAS") in accordance with Article R47 *et seq.* of the Code of Sports-related Arbitration (the "Code") against the decision of the DHP seeking in particular an increase in the sanction imposed on the Athlete. In its statement of appeal, WADA nominated Dr. Martin Schimke as an arbitrator.

10. On 13 February 2014, the CAS Court Office acknowledged receipt of WADA's statement of appeal/appeal brief and invited the Respondents to jointly nominate an arbitrator within ten (10) days receipt of the letter in accordance with Article R53 of the Code and file an answer within twenty (20) days receipt of the letter in accordance with Article R55 of the Code.

11. On 21 February 2014, the IWF informed the CAS Court Office that it neither intended to nominate an arbitrator nor submit a statement of appeal, but that it would abide by the award to be rendered. The Athlete did not respond to the statement of appeal.

12. On 21 March 2014, the CAS Court Office informed the parties that the President of the CAS Appeals Arbitration Division would appoint an arbitrator in lieu of the Respondents in accordance with Article R53 of the Code. In the same letter, the CAS Court Office confirmed that this appeal would be handled in English.

13. On 29 April 2014, the CAS Court Office confirmed with the Parties that the Panel appointed to decide this appeal was as follows:

President:	His Honour James Robert Reid QC, West Liss, Hampshire
Arbitrators:	Prof. Dr. Martin Schimke, attorney-at-law in Dusseldorf, Germany
	Mr. Alexander McLin, attorney-at-law in Geneve, Switzerland

14. On 20 May 2014, the CAS Court Office requested that the Russian Weightlifting Federation confirm that all such documents in this procedure which were sent to the federation on behalf of the Athlete, were indeed forwarded to the Athlete as requested.

15. The CAS Court Office received no such response to its request from the Russian Weightlifting Federation. In the absence of such a response, the Panel considered that the proper course is to rely on the maxim "*omnia rite*" and proceed with the arbitration. If it subsequently emerges that the Athlete had not been made aware of the proceedings, the Athlete can of course apply to have the award set aside and the matter re-considered.

16. On 20 May 2014, the CAS Court Office confirmed with the Parties that the Panel, decided to issue an award in this matter based solely on the parties' submissions, without holding a hearing, in accordance with Article R57 of the Code.

17. On 28 May 2014, the CAS Court Office sent the Parties an Order of Procedure. Such Order of Procedure was signed and returned by the Second Respondent on 30 May 2014 and the Appellant on 5 June 2014. The Athlete never signed or returned the Order of Procedure.

III. ADMISSIBILITY OF THE APPEAL AND JURISDICTION

18. The version of the ADP in force at the time of this appeal is the September 2012 version (the "2012 ADP"). The version of the ADP in force at the time of the taking of the sample and the hearing before the DHP was the 2009 version ("2009 ADP"). In these circumstances, the substantive elements of the appeal are governed by the rules in force at the time of the alleged violation (2009 ADP) subject to any application of the principle of *lex mitior* but the procedural aspects of the appeal are governed by the rules in force at the time of the appeal (see *CAS 2006/A/1008*). In the

present case the relevant provisions in the 2009 ADP and the 2012 ADP are to the same effect, save that the 2009 ADP provided for more severe penalties. Accordingly, by the application of the principle of *lex mitior*, any penalty which can be imposed on this appeal is limited by the provisions of the 2012 ADP.

19. The Competition was an International Event for the purposes of both the 2009 and 2012 ADP by virtue of the definitions contained in Appendix 1 of each of the 2009 and 2012 ADP. By Art. 13.2.1 of both the 2009 and 2012 ADP: *"In cases arising from participation in an International Event or in cases involving International Level Athletes, the decision may be appealed exclusively to CAS in accordance with the provisions applicable before such court."* By Art. 13.2.3 of both the 2009 ADP and the 2012 ADP WADA is given entitlement to appeal to CAS in cases falling under Art. 13.2.1. Accordingly, WADA had a right of appeal against the Decision to the CAS.

20. By Art. 13.6 of both the 2009 ADP and 2012 ADP an appeal deadline which is specific to WADA is given:

> *"The above notwithstanding, the filing deadline for an appeal or intervention filed by WADA shall be the later of:*
> *(a) Twenty-one (21) days after the last day on which any other party in the case could have appealed, or*
> *(b) Twenty-one (21) days after WADA's receipt of the complete file relating to the decision."*

21. Since WADA did not receive the complete file relating to the decision until 20 January 2014 and the appeal was lodged with CAS on 7 February 2014, the appeal is timely.

22. Given the length of time which had elapsed between the decision appealed and the date of the appeal, the Panel considered whether there was any evidence from which it could be inferred that there was a good faith obligation on WADA to have inquired as to the existence or progress of any disciplinary proceedings against the Athlete so as to impose a duty on WADA to commence any appeal to the CAS earlier than it did. *See, for example,* CAS 2007/A/1284 *and* CAS 2007/A/1308 *WADA v FENCA and Prieto* at paras 92 *et seq*. The Panel found no material upon which it could properly be said that WADA had been put on such notice. Accordingly, there was no basis upon which it could be said that WADA was not entitled to take advantage of the time limit set out in the rules.

23. The Panel is, therefore, satisfied that this appeal was commenced timely.

IV. APPLICABLE LAW

24. By Article R57 of the Code, the Panel has full power to review the facts and the law. It may issue a new decision which replaces the decision challenged or annul the decision and refer the case back to the previous instance.

25. In this regard, Article R58 of the Code provides as follows:

> *"The Panel shall decide the dispute according to the applicable regulations and the rules of law chosen by the parties or, in the absence of such a choice, according to the law of the country in which the federation, association or sports-related body which has issued the challenged decision is domiciled or according to the rules of law, the application of which the Panel deems appropriate. In the latter case, the Panel shall give reasons for its decision."*

26. Accordingly, this appeal shall be determined according to the regulations of the IWF and (the parties not having chosen any other law) Swiss law.

V. RELEVANT RULES

27. By Art. 2 of 2009 ADP, the presence of a Prohibited Substance or its Metabolites or Markers in an Athlete's Sample constitutes a doping offence. Cocaine is a Prohibited Substance by reason of it being classified under "S6 (a) (Non-Specified Stimulants)" on the 2011 WADA Prohibited List.

28. By Art. 10.2 of 2009 ADP:

> 10.2 *Ineligibility* for Presence, *Use* or *Attempted Use*, or *Possession* of *Prohibited Substances* and *Prohibited Methods*
>
> The period of *Ineligibility* imposed for a violation of Article 2.1 (Presence of *Prohibited Substance* or its *Metabolites* or *Markers*), Article 2.2 (*Use* or *Attempted Use* of *Prohibited Substance* or *Prohibited Method*) or Article 2.6 (*Possession* of *Prohibited Substances* and *Methods*) shall be as follows, unless the conditions for eliminating or reducing the period of *Ineligibility*, as provided in Articles 10.4 and 10.5, or the conditions for increasing the period of *Ineligibility*, as provided in Article 10.6, are met:
>
> First violation: Four (4) years' *Ineligibility*.

29. Art. 10.2 of the 2012 ADP provides for a lesser penalty of 2 years ineligibility in place of the 4 year period specified in the 2009 ADP.

30. By Art. 10.4:

> "10.4 Elimination or Reduction of the Period of *Ineligibility* for Specified Substances under Specific Circumstances
>
> Where an *Athlete* or other *Person* can establish how a Specified Substance entered his or her body or came into his or her possession and that such Specified Substance was not intended to enhance the *Athlete*'s sport performance or mask the use of a performance-enhancing substance, the period of *Ineligibility* found in Article 10.2 shall be replaced with the following:
> First violation: At a minimum, a reprimand and no period of *Ineligibility* from future *Events*, and at a maximum, two (2) years of *Ineligibility*.
> To justify any elimination or reduction, the *Athlete* or other *Person* must produce corroborating evidence in addition to his or her word which establishes to the comfortable satisfaction of the hearing panel the absence of an intent to enhance sport performance or mask the use of a performance enhancing substance. The *Athlete* or other *Person*'s degree of fault shall be the criterion considered in assessing any reduction of the period of *Ineligibility*.

31. By Art. 10.5:

> 10.5 Elimination or Reduction of Period of *Ineligibility* Based on Exceptional Circumstances
>
> 10.5.1 *No Fault or Negligence*
>
> If an *Athlete* establishes in an individual case that he or she bears *No Fault or Negligence*, the otherwise applicable period of *Ineligibility* shall be eliminated. When a *Prohibited Substance* or its *Markers* or *Metabolites* is detected in an *Athlete's Sample* in violation of Article 2.1 (presence of *Prohibited Substance*), the *Athlete* must also establish how the *Prohibited Substance* entered his or her system in order to have the period of *Ineligibility* eliminated. In the event this Article is applied and the period of *Ineligibility* otherwise applicable is eliminated, the anti-doping rule violation shall not be considered a violation for the limited purpose of determining the period of *Ineligibility* for multiple violations under Article 10.7.
>
> 10.5.2.1 *No Significant Fault or Negligence*
>
> If an *Athlete* or other *Person* establishes in an individual case that he or she bears *No Significant Fault or Negligence,* then the period of *Ineligibility* may be reduced, but the reduced period of *Ineligibility* may not be less than one-half of the period of *Ineligibility* otherwise applicable. If the otherwise applicable period of *Ineligibility* is a lifetime, the reduced period under this section may be no less than 8 years. When

> a *Prohibited Substance* or its *Markers* or *Metabolites* is detected in an *Athlete's Sample* in violation of Article 2.1 (Presence of *Prohibited Substance* or its *Metabolites* or *Markers*), the *Athlete* must also establish how the *Prohibited Substance* entered his or her system in order to have the period of *Ineligibility* reduced.

VI. PROCEDURE

A. Facts

32. The Athlete was born on 14 June 1994. She comes from a deprived background and the sport of weightlifting has given her an opportunity for upward social mobility. As was corroborated by her coach Mr Koltsov in the underlying proceeding, during her stay for the World Youth Championships at the St Augustine Hotel in Lima, Peru, the athlete drank a lot of juice and tea.

33. The tea she consumed was a "Delisse" brand tea named "Mate de Coca". The tea bags were freely available to all using the hotel dining room, being left close to the hot water container where they could be accessed by anyone who cared to use them. The Athlete used them for the purpose for which they appeared to be designed and supplied for the guests at the hotel, i.e. to infuse in water for the purpose of making tea to drink.

34. Mr Koltsov took some of the tea bags back to Russia, where later analysis by RUSADA found them to contain .08 mg of cocaine per 100 gms of tea. Neither the Athlete nor her coach knew that the tea contained cocaine. The athlete does not speak English and did not understand what was written on the tea bags. The cocaine metabolites were contained in tea bags that were available for use by all.

35. Although it is pretty general knowledge that cocaine is derived from the coca plant and that a number of countries in South America are sources of cocaine, the Athlete was not aware of this, although it would have been reasonable to expect her to be so. It is unfortunate that before her departure for Peru, the Russian Weightlifting Federation did not warn her that cocaine was produced in several South American countries, and that cocaine was derived from the coca plant. She should have been warned to avoid any product connected with the coca plant. Had the athlete and her coach been properly

prepared for their visit to Peru, it is likely that each would have avoided any edible product containing the word "coca" as being possibly a source of cocaine.

36. The Panel is comfortably satisfied that the cocaine metabolites entered the Athlete's body through the "Delisse" brand "Mate de Coca" tea she drank at her hotel, and that the athlete did not intend to enhance her sport performance by drinking it.

37. If she intended to use cocaine as a stimulant to enhance her sport performance, it is extremely unlikely that she would have used a method of ingestion that would require the drinking of a considerable quantity of tea to gain any stimulatory benefit. The tea probably would have passed through the athlete's body relatively quickly. If she consciously intended to use cocaine as a stimulant, it is much more likely that she would have used it in an illicit powder form, rather than drinking it in a very low concentration in the form of tea.

B. Parties' Submissions

38. On behalf of WADA it was submitted that:

- The sanctioning provisions under the 2012 ADP are less severe than the equivalent provisions under the 2009 ADP. In particular, the standard sanction for a breach of Art. 2.1 of the 2009 ADP was four years; the equivalent sanction under the 2012 IWF ADP is two years. In determining the applicable sanction, WADA accepted the application of the 2012 ADP on the basis of *lex mitior*. Accordingly the standard sanction for a breach of Art. 2.1 in this case would be a two-year period of ineligibility.

- The decision of the DHP was manifestly wrong being based on the mischaracterisation of cocaine as a Specified Stimulant (rather than a Non-Specified Stimulant) and the consequent erroneous application of Art. 10.4 of the ADP.

- Pursuant to Art. 10.5 of the 2012 ADP, if the Athlete could establish that, in view of the exceptional circumstances of her individual case, the otherwise applicable period of ineligibility might be eliminated (in the case of no fault or

negligence as per Art. 10.5.1 of the 2012 IWF ADP) or reduced by a maximum of half (in the case of no significant fault or negligence as per Art. 10.5.2 of the 2012 IWF ADP).

- As a pre-condition to the application of either Art. 10.5.1 or 10.5.2, an athlete must establish, on the balance of probabilities, the origin of the prohibited substance in her system. WADA accepted the Athlete's explanation that the cocaine entered her system as a result of her regular consumption, around the time of the Competition, of the tea known as "Mate de Coca". The DHP resolved correctly not to apply Art. 10.5.1 (No Fault or Negligence) to eliminate the period of ineligibility. In order to benefit from an elimination of the period of ineligibility for no fault or negligence, the Athlete had to establish that she did not know or suspect and could not reasonably have known or suspected, even with the exercise of the utmost caution, that she had used or been administered the prohibited substance.

- WADA noted CAS 2004/A/690 H v ATP, in which case the player had not only ingested tea made from coca leaves but had also over a period of days chewed coca leaves. In that case, the Panel, in the absence of any pertinent precedent, had expressed the opinion that the application of the exemption of "No Significant Fault or Negligence" was to be assessed on the basis of the particularities of the individual case at hand.

- The burden on an athlete to establish no fault or negligence is placed extremely high. CAS 2005/A/847 Hans Knauss v. FIS made clear that an athlete must make "every conceivable effort" to avoid taking a prohibited substance in order to benefit from 10.5.1. In this case, the Athlete failed to exercise the utmost caution and failed to make every conceivable effort to avoid taking the prohibited substance. The Athlete should have known that cocaine is derived from the coca plant (which was identified by in the name of the tea she consumed).

- The Athlete did not appeal against the Decision, which found that she did bear fault/negligence.

- If an athlete establishes that he/she bears no significant fault or negligence (as defined in the WADC), then the period of ineligibility may be reduced, but the reduced period of ineligibility may not be less than one half of the minimum period of ineligibility otherwise applicable (Art. 10.5.2 of the 2012 IWF ADP). Art. 10.5.2 does not allow the standard two-year sanction to be reduced below twelve months.

- In order to benefit from a reduction for no significant fault or negligence, the Athlete had to establish that the fault or negligence viewed in the totality of the circumstances and taking into account the criteria for "no fault or negligence" was not significant in relation to the anti-doping rule violation. Art. 2.5.2 is supposed to apply only in truly exceptional circumstances.

- In the particular circumstances of the case, WADA was prepared to accept that the Athlete did not have significant fault or negligence. Given that WADA did not receive the decision for some two years after it was given and the Athlete was not in any way responsible for the delay, that the proper penalty was the minimum permissible, namely a period of 12 months ineligibility.

39. The IWF responded to the Statement of Appeal by stating that it would not submit an answer and would abide by the award rendered.

40. The Athlete did not file any answer to the appeal.

VII. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

41. It is clear that the DHP decided the case under the misapprehension that cocaine was a Specified Substance under the 2009 ADP. It was for this reason that it felt that a reduced penalty could be imposed under Art 10.4 of the 2009 ADP. Had the DHP appreciated its error it would not have come to the conclusion to which it did.

42. Since CAS has full power to review the facts and the law (i.e. to treat the matter de novo and not merely as a review of the decision below, as has been well established by CAS jurisprudence, though it will pay proper regard and respect to the decision below) the Panel must start with the question whether the Athlete has established that there was no fault or negligence on her part. It is no answer, if the Panel is considering the matter de

novo, to say that the Athlete did not appeal the original decision. If that is established, then the Athlete may be relieved of any sanction.

43. If (as the DHP held and as WADA contends) it cannot be said that she was guilty of no fault or negligence, but she has established that she was guilty of no significant fault or negligence, the question then arises as to the extent to which the standard penalty should be mitigated, bearing in mind (i) the doctrine of lex mitior and (ii) that the penalty cannot be reduced to less than half the standard penalty.

44. The Panel noted that in CAS 2004/A/690 H v ATP, to which WADA referred, at para 45 the Panel in that case stated:

45. "If the Appellant had only consumed a tea made from coca leaves, the Panel may have been prepared to agree with the Appellant. Indeed, the Panel finds no reason to hold that the Appellant should have been particularly vigilant before drinking, in good faith, an herbal tea that was given to him by a friend and that was supposed to bring relief to his headaches and stomach aches. As members of the Panel have observed themselves, it is common practice in many Andean countries of South America to drink tea made of coca leaves to soothe the effects which high altitude may have on the human body. The Panel therefore is of the opinion that the Appellant was not significantly negligent in drinking the tea that was offered to him without enquiring about its nature or source."

46. In the present case, the Athlete is a young girl from a deprived background. She does not speak English, and more pertinently (given the country in which the events took place) there was no suggestion she spoke Spanish. Indeed, there was no evidence as to whether or not she understood the western, as opposed to the Cyrillic, alphabet. She engaged in a normal activity and made and drank a tea from sachets laid out and made available for the purpose to all guests staying at the hotel at which she was lodged for the purposes of the competition. She was not apparently aware that the word "coca" in the name of the drink indicated that it might contain the leaves of the plant from which cocaine is produced and so might itself contain cocaine.

47. The gravamen of the allegation of fault against her is that she took no precautions to ensure that what she chose to drink did not contain any prohibited substance. The

suggestion is that she had not been properly prepared for her trip because she had not been made aware of this possibility and was therefore at fault. Whether that is the case or not, it does not deal with the fact that the Athlete had a responsibility for what she ingested. As was said in CAS 2005/A/847 Knauss v FIS an athlete must take every conceivable effort to avoid taking a prohibited substance.

48. In CAS 2004/A/690 H v ATP the Panel expressed the view that there was no reason why the athlete in that case should have been particularly vigilant before drinking in good faith an herbal tea given him by a friend. Similarly, it might have been said that there was no reason why the Athlete should have been particularly vigilant about a tea provided for all guests at the hotel. However, while the Panel in H v ATP found that the fault or negligence of the athlete was not significant with respect to drinking the tea, it could not go so far as to find that there was no fault or negligence involved. Moreover, that case was decided more than a decade ago. Over the years since H v ATP was decided, athletes have had their obligation to ensure that they do not ingest any prohibited substance drummed into them. The knowledge generally available to athletes has changed over that period. An athlete cannot now, in the view of this Panel, be regarded as being absolved from all responsibility when choosing to make up a drink from a sachet containing an unknown herbal substance, particularly one with the word "Coca" in its name, even when that substance is made freely available to all the guests in a hotel dining room.

49. Based upon all the circumstances, the Panel takes the view that while it cannot be said that the Athlete was guilty of no fault or negligence, the level of fault or negligence by the Athlete cannot be described as significant. She made an unfortunate and understandable error. The Panel is therefore satisfied that the sanction imposed should be the minimum that can properly be imposed under Art. 10.5.2. Given the application of the rule of lex mitior it follows that the proper penalty which should be imposed is one of one year's ineligibility.

50. In any event, the Athlete is entitled to be credited with the six-month period of ineligibility already served, which ran from 4 July 2011 when she was provisionally suspended. However, in addition, by 2009 ADP Art. 10.9.1 (which is reproduced in 2012 ADP) where there have been substantial delays in the hearing process or other aspects of

Doping Control not attributable to the Athlete, the IWF or Anti-Doping Organization imposing the sanction may start the period of ineligibility at an earlier date commencing as early as the date of sample collection or the date on which another anti-doping rule violation last occurred.

51. In the present case, there was an unconscionable delay in the commencement of this appeal brought about by the apparent unexplained failure of the IWF to comply with its obligation under Art. 8.1.6 of the 2009 ADP to notify WADA of the result of the hearing before the DHP. The Athlete was entitled to believe that the matter had been closed and to get on with her career. It would be unconscionable for her now to be required to serve any further period of ineligibility. In these circumstances the appropriate course is to commence the period of one year's ineligibility from the date of her sample collection on 13 May 2011.

VIII. COSTS

52. This is an appeal exclusively disciplinary in nature rendered by an international body. The provisions of Art. R65 of the CAS Code therefore applies and the Panel has discretion to grant the prevailing party a contribution towards its legal fees and other expenses. The Athlete took no part in the appeal and was in no way responsible for the necessity for the prevailing party, WADA, to bring this appeal. WADA made use of its internal legal resources and no witness or interpreter expenses were incurred. In all the circumstances of the present case, the Panel takes the view that the appropriate order is that the IWF should pay CHF 1,000 to WADA (thereby reimbursing it for the Court Office fee paid on the commencement of this appeal) but that there should be no other award of costs.

ON THESE GROUNDS

The Court of Arbitration for Sport rules that:

1. The Appeal filed by the World Anti-Doping Agency against the decision of the IWF Doping Hearing Panel dated 20 November 2011 in the matter of Ms Daria Goltsova is upheld.

2. The decision of the IWF Doping Hearing Panel is set aside and replaced with the following:

   A period of one year's ineligibility shall be imposed on Ms Daria Goltsova, such period of ineligibility to run from 13 May 2011.

3. All sporting results obtained by Ms Daria Goltsova between 13 May 2011 up to the expiry of the period of ineligibilty shall be invalidated.

4. The International Weightlifting Federation shall pay a contribution of CHF 1,000 to the costs and expenses of the World Anti-Doping Agency.

5. This award is pronounced without costs, except for the Court Office fee of CHF 1'000 paid by the World Anti-Doping Agency which shall be retained by the CAS.

6. All other or further claims are dismissed.

Lausanne, 12 August 2014

THE COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT

His Hon. James Robert Reid QC
President of the Panel